Today marks the 77th anniversary of the TIDAL WAVE mission.
It has been an eventful year for all of us, and as usual I’m way late in posting an update on my TIDAL WAVE book and documentary progress.
The Wuhan virus idiocy has really thrown a monkey wrench into my (and all other researcher/authors’) timelines, with the worldwide shutdown of archives and other research sources. Nonetheless, I’ve made tremendous progress on the project, some of which I’ll get to in a bit.
First, though, a lesson in failure and painful recovery. Frankly, this year I’ve paid a huge price for my own previous laziness. And there’s a lesson for all of us in this.
As you know, I’ve been acquiring documentation, maps, photos, etc., related to the TIDAL WAVE operation for many years, much of it in electronic form. (I also have two legal-size filing cabinets about to overflow into a third cabinet as well as 55 shelf feet of books related to various aspects of the event.)
Back to the electronic files. Over the years I saved and backed up TW electronic files on 14 different hard drives, which is obviously untenable when you need to find something. I finally consolidated all that info on one brand-new 12-terabyte drive. So far, so good.
However, due to my own previous laziness I had failed to give these files meaningful names when I first acquired them, merely saving them with whatever name the computer program automatically assigned. Like DSCN4258.jpg and File1.docx and Untitled.psd and binder1.pdf. Oh, so very helpful!
When you save files on multiple disks over many years you end up with a LOT of duplicates. Like a grand total of over 1.5 million (yes, seriously, 1,500,000+) electronic files. This is not as impressive a number as it might sound since a document of, say, 300 pages that I scanned at the US or Romanian national archives had a separate electronic file for each page. 300 pages = 300 electronic files. Duplicate/back that up five times and you have 1500 files.
Of course the vast bulk of this 1.5 million were dupes, but my file naming failure meant I had to individually examine every one of those files, then either give it a meaningful name or delete it as a dupe.
This was not as much fun as it sounds. In fact it took me from mid-January 2020 to the end of May to grind through that mountain of material.
Then I had to organize and apply the same file structure to both my electronic and paper files. This took another month, bringing us to the first of July. While all this was extremely painful and time-consuming, it was also fun in the sense I rediscovered documentation I’d totally forgotten about!
Sorry about this long description, but there really is a lesson here, particularly for researchers and authors. Organize as you go along or there’ll be hell to pay later!
COOL STUFF
Among other things, I rediscovered 400 pages of single-spaced Romanian documentation covering German and Romanian Flak, and even more interesting, every alert and update message the Romanians sent on 1 August through 4 August 1943. Because the Romanian docs also include considerable German material, they give a complete record of Axis defensive activities on the day of the attack. It took me more than a week to translate, but was well worth the investment.
Tidbits: Only one 37mm Flak battery of 12 guns was present on 1 Aug. That Romanian-manned battery fired ZERO shots during the attack. How do we know? Because both the Germans and Romanian reported the number of rounds fired by each caliber gun on 1 Aug. The number for 37mm was zero and the report stated the 37mm guns were “not used during the attack.”
I can now confirm there were no Flakvierlings (4-barrel 20mm Flak guns) present in Ploesti on 1 Aug. Certainly they arrived late in 1943, but this has been an issue bothering me for years.
We also know no rifle-caliber machine guns were fired during the attack—this is a huge surprise since many crews reported being shot at by MGs. Only 3,000 rounds of rifle ammunition was fired, all from rifles and carbines. Very unexpected!
A post-attack analysis by the Romanian Flak command included considerable details about the early warning system. I often find Romanian reports to be contradictory and inaccurate, and such is the case with this analysis, which grandly announced the early warning system worked “perfectly” (same word in English and Romanian).
But just one page later the same report lists specific failures of the early warning system! Furthermore, upon additional research I discovered their analysis included reporting from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria that didn’t arrive in Romania until 2 August! Not exactly useful to receive early warning info the day after the battle is fought.
I also learned barrage balloons were credited with bringing down seven B-24s—a much higher number than previously reported. All balloon companies were Romanian-manned, and they were not successful in launching a number of balloons due to equipment failures.
A SAAF Mosquito flew two recce (bomb damage assessment) flights, on 3 and 19 Aug 43. Neither was detected by the Axis defenses. This is interesting because in both cases the plane circled above the city for about 30 minutes.
On a different subject, I’ve now documented through multiple sources the new B-24Ds in the 389th Bomb Group (and a handful of new replacement ships for the other bomb groups) had their belly turrets removed in the desert prior to the mission. This saved considerable weight and thus extended the ship’s range. This has been a question for decades that I’m glad to solve.
There’s tons more new or corrected revelations, including previously unknown results of the attack. My book will cover all this in detail.
So what’s my schedule? At the beginning of the year I intended to have the first draft written and out for peer review by today. Circumstances and my own poor previous performance prevents that. At this point I’m shooting to have the first draft out for peer review by the end of the year and the book in print no later than mid-2021.
This stuff takes a long time if you want to get it right!
Dave Klaus
Thanks for the update. Yes, you can’t rush perfection. I look forward to purchasing this book.
Hi Andrew
Thanks. I’m working my butt off to 1) get the story right and 2) create a readable story!
Dave
Hi Dave, I feel your pain – I have hundreds of photos saved with the camera designations instead of subject labels, and at some point I will have to organize everything. It’s really easy to find stuff that is correctly labeled – the other stuff, not so much.
On another subject, I talked with Dana Bell at the last IPMS convention in Chattanooga, and we talked about Ent. He mentioned that Ent had been taking amphetamines to keep alert during his last-minute planning for the mission and it was possible that was largely responsible for his performance on 1 Aug 43. I think it might be fairer to mention this as it can explain some most critical errors of judgment he made, leading to a compromised mission. Obviously, USAAF felt this too, and gave him another chance to excel, which he did training B-29 crews for the Pacific. Just my two bits, but I thought it was interesting. Someone really ought to make a movie…..
I am very glad the project is proceeding and look forward to what you come up with. Hang in there – as you may know, there was a recent discussion of Tidal Wave on Hyperscale which was rather interesting to me, since I have heard your presentation twice. Your work will absolutely blow their minds…..
Hi Bruce
I should have broken the “proper labeling” project into bite-size chunks as time went along. Doing it all at once was back-breaking.
To be clear, the question of Ent and bennies is unproven. Without doubt amphetamines were available for issue to USAAF pilots by early spring 1943, so we can presume they were available in Benghazi at the time of TW. This is particularly true since B-24 missions in North Africa were very long–much longer than 8th and 12th Air Force’s B-17 missions during the same period, so it would have made sense for them to have been available to 9AF pilots.
During the run-up to TW Ent was not only IX Bomber Command commander, he was also the Benghazi Base Command commander, responsible for all the supply, maintenance, administrative, and defensive activities of the USAAF–AND RAF–in the Benghazi area. This comprised more than a dozen active airfields, bombers, transports, some fighters, Flak guns, etc. This was a massive load to put on one man’s shoulders.
One could easily see how this might–repeat MIGHT–have led to amphetamine use just to get up each morning and keep going until late that night. It’s certain USAAF flight surgeons were extremely tight about issuing bennies to aircrew, but Ent had direct access (and command) to all the flight surgeons in the Benghazi area. One could speculate that if he’d wanted to take more speed than one flight surgeon was willing to issue, he could have easily gotten more. Remember, this is no more than informed speculation and is in no way proof or accusation! It could, on the other hand, suggest why his behavior was so erratic just before and during TW.
This is a critical issue, because when he was sent home after TW–never to have another combat command–he was made commander of 2nd Air Force in Colorado Springs. Arnold personally relieved the previous 2AF commander for failure to adequately train B-29 crews headed to the Pacific. Ent was a HUGE success in the training role, and was the only 2-star Arnold mentioned by name in the introduction to his postwar autobiography. Arnold loved the job Ent did in turning the B-29 training program around.
I will discuss all this and much more in my book.
Dave
Dave –
I was wondering where you were… Glad to hear you are OK… If I can be of assistance in the peer review. I would be glad to help…
Best Regards ,
Mark Hester (son of E Lynn Hester- 376th Group Bombardier )
Hi Mark
Many thanks for reconnecting. I’ll certainly be back in touch with you, and thanks for your offer.
Dave
I am looking forward to your book and other documentation you may issue. I read about this mission when i was 15 years old (longer ago than I care to admit) This project has been your quest that all historians will gain knowledge from.
Thank you
Hi Jack
Yes, this project is three things to me: first, a labor of love, particularly since I served in the 44th 35 years after TW. Second, it’s one of my major “bucket list” projects to complete. And third, and actually most important, I was charged by General Leon Johnson, who earned the Medal of Honor leading the 44th Bomb Group into Ploesti, with telling the true story of TIDAL WAVE. General Johnson told me in plain English what had happened on the mission, then charged me to go prove it!
Dave
I am super excited to say the least. Thank you for the update. Keep on chugging through the mountain of materials! Stay safe.
Hi Lance
Thanks much for your kind words. I’m working hard!
Dave
Hi Dave-
Does this mean that the ball turrets were removed for this mission on all the new B-24Ds?
Hi John
Yes, exactly that. No ball turrets on any TIDAL WAVE B-24Ds. It’s unclear at exactly which Block on the production line the turrets were incorporated (even B-24 expert Al Blue didn’t know), but certainly some of the 389th’s brand-new ships had the turrets. All 389th ships were from Block 70 through Block 100, so it’s possible some in the earlier blocks did not have turrets installed at all. Regardless, if a ship had a belly turret, it was removed in the middle of July.
In addition, although not specifically mentioned in official correspondence, it’s likely all ships beyond a certain production Block had the ball turret (we’re obviously speaking of the ball turret, not the horrible remotely-operated turret on a few of the original B-24D-CO ships). That means the possibility exists that seven 44th, four 93rd, six 98th, and four 376th brand-new replacement ships might also have had ball turrets; if so, it would have been removed from these ships as well. This is not documented anywhere I’ve found, but that at least some of these replacements arrived with this turret is simple logic.
As I noted, the point of removing the ball turrets was to reduce considerable weight, which gave the ship longer range. On a 2400 mile round trip this was a primary consideration!
Dave
I’ve been following your progress for years now, Dave, and I’m glad to see it coming together. Yes, COVID’s thrown a monkey in the wrench for a lot of us working on historical book projects (I am, too, but not – for a change – military history, which is my usual forte), but I’m glad you were able to put the time to good purpose sorting out files. Lesson learned for a lot of us, I’m afraid.
Good luck and keep moving forward – eager to see the end result.
Hi Ned
Good to hear from you! Thanks for your kind words. I’m eager too (I want to bring this baby in for a smooth landing so I can get on with my other huge projects!!).
Dave
hey Dave ,I’m sure you don’t remember meeting me at an IPMS Nationals years ago. I have purchased several of your CE Detail sets and decals over the years. this spring I finished your FW190A-5 Black 13 in 48th scale and recently your P39 Air a cutie in 48th scale . I have both of you Ploesti Raiders sheets but will be interested in seeing the new ones. I want to do a 48th scale Hail Columbia. I purchased a paperback copy of Low Level Mission for 35 cents when I was in eighth grade(1961-62) which I still have. I own 2 limited edition prints depicting the mission, one of which is Robert Taylor’s “Vital Mission” with signatures of five raiders. Anyway I look forward to your book and DVD.
Hi Stan
Thanks for your kind comments. I didn’t see Wolff’s book until probably the early ’70s, but I did get a copy of Stewart & Dugan’s Ploesti book in 1968. Their account of the mission really perplexed me since the “leader went down in the Med” and “early turn” explanations simply didn’t make sense (they reported the best publicly available information at the time, the USAAF’s 1944 official report on the TIDAL WAVE mission). Nonetheless, their work was herculean and really told the “war stories” very well. Thanks for contacting me.
Dave
Hi Dave – So glad to see you recovered from trip thru the 1.5+ Million File Jungle. Been there on some technical projects, and the company I work for now has many of their specs, drawings, reports, technical product documents stored the same way so when you want to search for something you have to open and close alot of files, and since their stored in a read only database, you can’t even change the file names to help the next person following you. Crazy. I am still working on collecting information for my book about 2nd Lt. William M. Wright, the Navigator who was killed aboard the Brewery Wagon, when Pilot 1st Lt. John Palm broke away from the wrong turning 376th group and went on direction of “Little Bill” to return to the correct course that would lead him to the target. Unfortunately since Palm was now flying alone, he drew the attention of every Flak battery and gun that could be brought to bear, plus German ME-109 Pilot Willie Steinmann, circling near the targets, and suffered the consequences of his decision, while the rest of the 376th BG flew toward Budapest, and turned back after recognizing their mistake. 2nd Lt. Wright was mentioned in several books about the raid, and I would like to coordinate our efforts so I not only get my story right, and honor his sacrifice for our country, but also so I don’t steal any thunder from your efforts, without giving you direct credit for the information you uncovered. I know you are very busy, and I am looking forward to your book. I would like the opportunity to compare notes and let you see what I have, and also get on the peer review list for your book if possible. While I have not completed a book yet, I, like you have had a life-long interest in the Tidal Wave Raid, and recall how several people have tried to get this story recorded on paper, and would like to assist your effort to tell the truth about what happened, and the interesting details of this amazing story in any way I could. Thanks for the update, and stay healthy!
Hi John
Very interesting. I’ll contact you direct by email.
Dave
Hi Dave –
Interesting news about the type of Flak guns operational at the time of the raid, and their ammo usage. Was going to put some Flak Gun / Crew Pics in my book, so I will now have to stay away from pics of the 37mm guns and machine guns, and stick with the single barrel 20mm guns and the 88’s. Interesting news about the machine gun usage too. You would think there would be some machine guns specifically mounted with anti-aircraft sights brought in and installed around the target areas. Maybe the German leadership never took the likelihood of a low-level attack seriously, considering it to be foolishly ineffective or impossible. Dive bombers, which they were well familiar with what their own Stukas were capable of, were not feared in the Ploesti target area, since any allied dive bomber lacked sufficient range to get there. In their paradigm, dive bombers would be the only way of delivering the bombing accuracy they thought necessary to knock out and cripple important refinery buildings and installations. Maybe at that time, they even considered a low-level attack suicidal from their perspective, by a large formation of lumbering, slow, vulnerable four-engine bombers that were the only aircraft with the range to make the trip, as they were focused on building one of the most-dense, and toughest Flak defenses in the war to fight them at high altitude. I would think any soldier stationed in the area armed with a MG34, or a Romanian machine gun who wasn’t diving for cover, would have been trying to shoot back at the multiple waves of flying .50 Calibers chopping everything up in the target and Flak positions. Possibly with the low-level attack, from what turned out to be multiple angles, the B-24’s would have been on top of them and gone in a short time frame to set up and do much effective shooting. Wonder if the later waves of B-24 aircraft over the targets reported taking more rifle and machine gun fire, and received more smaller caliber bullet damage or wounds than those reaching and hitting the targets first? The later waves definitely received more effective, and deadlier Flak fire. Any correlation? Comments, and corrections welcome! I have learned so much from just what you’ve published on your website – thank you for all your efforts to get the details and truth of this great battle out to those who want to learn & know more, and those that should be, and need to be taught to remember the bravery of our WWII airmen. Stay healthy!
Hi John
See below; I’ll contact you via email. Also recall that Ploesti had not been attacked in two years, although Soviet bombers attacked the west coast (Black Sea coast/Constanta area) on a regular basis. Their battle experience on the Russian Front and around Constanta suggested low level attacks could and would come from single-engine fighters and light bombers only, neither of which types had anywhere near the range to get to Ploesti, let alone back to base. While I can’t currently document this, it’s militarily reasonable to use scarce hardware where it’s most likely to be used and effective. That would not have included Ploesti or Bucharest with regards to machine guns.
Dave
Dave,
Thanks for the update looking forward to your book. Interesting that the all the small caliber stuff was rifles and carbines just emphasizes how low they were flying to encounter all that small arms fire.
Hi Tom
Yes; as I mentioned the crews reported being shot at by machine guns, but we have to remember at 150′ they flashed by any given ground position in seconds and it was very difficult to discern exactly what was being thrown at them. They could hear the 88s and 20mm automatic guns, and so much Flak was being thrown at the same time it’s understandable the 20mm automatics might have sounded like machine guns. The more I know about the attack the more in awe I am of the crews that forged ahead with the attack. (I’ll get into who did and who did not attack in the book.)
Dave
Hi Tom
Yes. As I mentioned, many crews reported being shot at by machine guns, but at 150′ altitude their plane flashed by any given ground position within seconds, making it very difficult to discern what was being thrown at them. They could hear the 88s and 20mm automatic cannons, and with so much Flak coming their way it’s easy to understand how multiple 20mm automatics firing at the same time could sound like machine guns from inside the Libs. The more I know about what actually happened, the more in awe I am of the crews that actually attacked. (My book will go into considerable detail about who did and who did not attack.)
Dave
Hi Dave,
Don Jenkins here. Nephew of 2ndLT Donald Jenkins, co-pilot for L’il Joe.
I am my uncle’s name sake. Wonder if you can help me find the graphics for the nose art on L’il Joe?
Could you respond to my personal email below? I would definitely appreciate it.
Yes, also put me on your book list.
Hey Don
See the email I sent you direct. Let me know if you need more.
Dave